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Protecting the rights of patients in psychiatric settings: A comparison 
of the work of the Mental Health Act Commission with the CQC 
Dr Judy Laing* 
Since April 2009, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has been 
responsible for regulating standards of health and adult social care in 
England, as well as monitoring the operation of the Mental Health Act 
1983. The latter function was previously performed by the Mental 
Health Act Commission (MHAC). This article compares the role and 
functions of both bodies in terms of their ability to provide a 
legitimate system of regulation and an effective safeguard for 
psychiatric patients who are deprived of their liberty. This paper is 
important, as there is very little published data to date on the work of 
the CQC and its predecessor, the MHAC.  It is also necessary to 
evaluate changes to the regulatory landscape and compare the 
different regimes, to find out whether it has improved the protection 
and quality of care for mental heath patients. The article concludes 
that the CQC does have the capacity to monitor detention, enforce 
standards and improve the quality of patient care, as long as it 
continues to endorse a commitment to human rights and service user 
involvement, to preserve the expertise and knowledge of visiting 
inspectors and to maintain accountability and political independence 
from the State. 
Keywords: Care Quality Commission; Mental Health Act 
Commission; Mental Health Act 1983; patient rights; monitoring  
detention; regulating mental health care.  
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The Mental Health Act Commission was established alongside the Mental 
Health Act 1983 (MHA) in England and Wales to monitor, on behalf of the 
Secretary of State, the operation of the MHA in respect of patients detained in 
hospital.1 On 31st March 2009, the MHAC ceased to exist and the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) now carries out its functions in England.2 The government’s 
rationale for the change was to enhance professional regulation, create an 
integrated regulator and harmonise standards across health and adult social care. 
Some would argue, however, that the rationalisation was driven primarily by 
economic factors and the merger was not without opposition. For example, the 
former MHAC itself was concerned that the rationalisation could impact 
negatively on the rights of service users and create an even greater squeeze on 
limited resources (MHAC 2008: paras. 8.2 and 8.19). This article will compare 
and contrast the roles, powers and approaches of both bodies and consider to what 
extent the CQC, as the new health and social care watchdog for England and a 
single regulator, is able to take on a broader view that relates more closely to the 
experiences of people who use mental health and care services. This assessment 
will necessarily entail an examination of the extent to which the activity of the 
MHAC has been successfully integrated within the CQC. 
Significantly, this article will consider the relative effectiveness of each 
body in the context of our international obligations under the United Nations 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT). The UK 
                                                        
1
   Scotland is governed by its own mental health legislation and there is a similar 
specialist monitoring body – the Mental Welfare Commission - in place in that jurisdiction. In 
Ireland, the presence of the Mental Health Commission is designed to ‘promote, encourage and 
foster the establishment and maintenance of high standards and good practices in the delivery of 
mental health services and to take all reasonable steps to protect the interests of persons detained 
in approved centres under [the 2001 Mental Health] Act’. S. 33(1) Mental Health Act 2001 
(Ireland). On the effectiveness of the Commission in discharging its statutory functions see C 
Murray, The role of the Mental Health Commission in Irish mental health law: interrogating the 
effectiveness of the statutory functions of the Commission (2011) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 
93. 
2
   In Wales, the Healthcare Inspectorate has taken over this monitoring role and it has 
produced two sets of annual reports to date on monitoring the Mental Health Act and the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, located at 
www.hiw.org.uk. The Healthcare Inspectorate is also responsible for regulating all health care in 
Wales. 
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government ratified the OPCAT on 10th December 2003 and designated 18 
institutions for the National Preventive Mechanism in 2009, including among 
them the Care Quality Commission for England, the Mental Welfare Commission 
for Scotland,3 and in Wales, the Healthcare Inspectorate. National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs) are national bodies that have the mandate to conduct regular 
visits to places of detention, as well as to make recommendations and 
observations to the government and relevant authorities to improve the situation 
of the persons deprived of their liberty.  The OPCAT expressly requires that such 
NPMs be designated by the State parties, and details some of the basic powers and 
protections necessary for an NPM to be effective. The key elements of that 
effectiveness are: a blend of appropriate experience and expertise of visiting 
teams; a regular system of preventive and unannounced visits, and operational and 
financial independence from the State. 4  The involvement of service users in 
inspection arrangements coupled with a focus on protecting human rights are also 
desirable in this context.   Some of these features are also essential components of 
effective regulation, as identified by Baldwin and Cave (1999). In their view, 
legitimate regulation requires an investigation into the expertise of the regulatory 
body, as well as its procedures for ensuring due process and accountability, and 
the extent to which it achieves its legislative mandate (1999: Chapter 6). This 
requires an examination of the extent to which the regulator allows affected 
parties to participate in the regulatory processes and decisions, by involving 
service users/patients here for example; the extent to which it achieves its 
published objectives/mandate, and whether there are proper systems of scrutiny 
                                                        
3
   The Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland monitors the operation of the Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 and the welfare parts of the Adults with 
Incapacity Act 2000.  It has a wide remit to investigate the operation of the legislation and 
conditions in psychiatric settings, in particular to investigate whether a patient is being ill-treated 
or neglected. 
4
   Several concepts appear in this Article which are fundamental to the National 
Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – preventive visits; undertaken on a regular basis that form part of 
an overall system of visits; experts of the NPM should have the required capabilities and 
professional knowledge and the NPM should have functional independence from the State. See 
further Articles 18 and 19 of OPCAT. For further discussion of these key elements see E Steinerte, 
R Murray and J Laing, Monitoring those deprived of their liberty in psychiatric and social care 
institutions and national practice in the UK (2012) 16(6) The International Journal of Human 
Rights 865-882. 
4 
 
and accountability in place. These elements will also be explored in the discussion 
below. However, the CQC’s precise impact in providing a more effective 
safeguard is much more difficult to assess, given the recent nature of the changes 
and the lack of measurable outcomes for regulatory regimes in terms of affecting 
the behaviour of those subject to regulation. Quick has reviewed the available 
research on the extent to which regulation impacts on the behaviour of the 
regulated body and found major gaps in knowledge in terms of precisely how this 
plays out in practice (1999). 5  Quick’s review suggested that this could be caused 
by the problems in singling out the exact impact that regulation has, given the 
myriad of other sources of influence on behaviour. Moreover, Huising and 
Sibley’s research suggests that ‘factors internal to the organisation, not legislative 
or regulatory design, influence the dynamics of compliance’ (2011). The key 
message from Quick’s review of the literature, however, is that regulation ‘is far 
more likely to be complied with when accepted as legitimate by practitioners’ 
(1999:3). Arguably therefore, the perception of the CQC by the regulated sector 
i.e. those who work in the health and social care field will be a significant factor 
in terms of the influence it is able to exert on securing improvements in the 
standards of care in the sector. 
The Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) 
The MHAC was established under the Mental Health Act 1983. Its work 
involved the deployment of independent Commissioners to carry out frequent, 
short-notice and often unannounced visits to all National Health Service (NHS) 
and independent hospitals and care homes in England and Wales where patients 
may be detained, to check the legality of detention and to interview patients in 
private to ascertain whether they were being treated appropriately and within the 
law.  Commissioners were employed on a part-time basis and came from a variety 
of relevant professional backgrounds and also included former service users. The 
                                                        
5
   The key finding to emerge from this review is the lack of systematic knowledge on how 
professional regulation affects the behaviour of those subject to regulation. The study concluded 
that this is likely to reflect the difficulties involved in seeking to single out the impact that 
regulation has on behaviour, given the myriad of other sources of influence. The message to 
emerge from a number of studies is that regulation is far more likely to be complied with when 
accepted as legitimate by practitioners. 
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MHAC had a number of key functions. The MHA gave the Commission the 
power to investigate complaints and assist with the production and revision of the 
accompanying Code of Practice. The MHAC was also charged with producing a 
biennial report, which was laid before Parliament; this reported on the MHAC’s 
monitoring programme and findings and placed the work of the MHAC under 
parliamentary scrutiny.  The MHAC was not a regulatory body per se: its key 
focus was on the protection of individual patients whose rights are restricted 
under mental health legislation. However it did comment more generally in its 
biennial reports on the conditions of care for patients detained in psychiatric 
settings. The reports also demonstrated a deep concern for human rights 
principles, which became an important feature of the MHAC’s safeguarding work. 
In 2006, it published a Strategy on Equality and Human Rights, which aimed to 
promote a rights-based approach throughout every aspect of its work (MHAC 
2006). This methodology was commended by the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Human Rights in 2007, which praised the MHAC for adopting a committed 
and ‘systematic approach’ to human rights (HC 378: para. 188).  
There is paucity of research on the role of the MHAC and the work of the 
MHA Commissioners in England and Wales. Nevertheless there is some evidence 
to suggest that the MHAC was perceived by many as providing an effective 
safeguard and voice for patients. For example, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
in its response to the Health and Social Care Bill in 2007, commented that: 
‘[The MHAC’s approach] has been instrumental in giving a voice 
to those who are detained, those who provide care, and those who 
campaign for better care’ (RCP 2007).  
 And the Mental Health Alliance, a coalition campaign group of 75 
voluntary /user organisations and professional groups, commented that: 
‘The MHAC has played a crucial role in improving compliance with the 
Mental Health Act and in safeguarding and ensuring the rights and 
welfare of people detained in hospital under the Act’. 6 
                                                        
6
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In terms of making an impact, it is widely accepted that the MHAC 
commanded respect among the practitioners who worked with the Mental Health 
Act. However, the MHAC’s remedial powers were restricted, as a matter of 
policy, it generally only investigated complaints when hospital managers had not 
been able to satisfactorily resolve the issue7 and it was unable to award remedies 
to aggrieved detained patients. Other concerns about the operation of the MHAC 
during its lifetime related to internal conflicts and an inability to control its 
finances during the late 1980s, as well as regional variations in visiting practices, 
ethos and style (Cavadino 1995:60). This led to a more centrally controlled 
structure and attempts at standardization of visiting methodology from the early 
1990s onwards (Cavadino 1995:61-62). 
The Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
The cornerstone of the CQC’s work is the system of registration for health 
and adult social care that was introduced by the Health and Social Care Act 2008. 
The CQC seeks to ensure that the care provided by hospitals, dentists, care homes, 
private ambulances and in people’s own homes, meets Government standards of 
quality and safety. Before the CQC will grant a licence to operate, the providers 
must show that their services meet the essential standards  for quality and safety.8  
Since 31st March 2009, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has taken over the 
monitoring functions of the MHAC. 
The CQC adopts a compliance-based approach to its regulatory function, 
by setting specific performance standards by which health and adult social care 
providers are judged. There are 28 standards in all, which have been set by the 
                                                                                                                                                        
   Mental Health Alliance, Alliance Policies: The Inspectorate located at 
www.mentalhealthalliance.org.uk/policy/inspectorate.html. 
7
   Under s. 120(1)(b)(i) of the unamended MHA 1983 any 'general' complaint about a 
matter that occurred whilst a person was detained had to be a matter that the MHAC felt had not 
been satisfactorily dealt with by the hospital managers. However, in theory, the MHAC’s power to 
investigate complaints was much broader. Under s. 120(1)(b)(ii), it could investigate any other 
complaint as to the exercise of powers and duties under the Act, regardless of whether the hospital 
managers had already tried to deal with it. 
8
   The essential standards are set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated 
Activities) Regulations 2010 and the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009. 
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Government. They demand a certain level of service, and in some cases specify 
how that service is to be delivered. The CQC focus is primarily on the 16 
standards that most directly relate to quality and safety of patient/service user 
care, some of which explicitly relate to patient rights and dignity. The standards 
prescribe certain outcomes to be achieved and, at times, the process for achieving 
them, such as respecting and involving service users in the delivery of services 
(Outcome 1); ensuring that providers act in accordance with the consent of service 
users (Outcome 2); ensuring that service users experience care that is effective, 
safe and appropriate, and which meets their needs and protects their rights 
(Outcome 4); supporting service users to have adequate nutrition and hydration 
(Outcome 5); and ensuring that people who use services are protected from abuse, 
and their human rights are respected and upheld (Outcome 7) Initially, the 
Government published 28 standards and the CQC focused primarily on the 16 
standards that most directly related to quality and safety of patient/service user 
care. The standards were revised and simplified in 2013 and there are now 5 
standards in total, which are monitored by the CQC.  The standards prescribe 
certain outcomes to be achieved and, at times, the process for achieving them, 
such as respecting and involving service users in the delivery of services 
(Standard 1), ensuring that service users are safe (Standard 3) and receiving care, 
treatment and support that meets their needs (Standard 2)..  
Most importantly, the same standards now apply to all care sectors. So 
mental health care providers must now be registered by the CQC and demonstrate 
that the care that they provide meets the essential standards.  The CQC aims to 
carry out assessments at least once every two years. The assessment is carried out 
by Compliance Inspectors – generic full-time inspectors employed at the CQC, 
who check all the relevant information about the provider, and by visiting the 
service to talk to the people who use it and the staff, to observe how the care is 
provided and to check the provider’s records.  Standard setting is a common 
regulatory response, though it is not without difficulty, and commentators have 
observed that ‘the fairness and transparency of standard-setting processes, as well 
as the accountability of the standard-setters, are factors that tend to loom large 
when… legitimation is under discussion’ (Baldwin and Cave 1999:124). 
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The functions of the CQC remain the same following the transfer of 
responsibilities. However its remit is much broader than that of the MHAC. The 
MHAC was restricted to monitoring patients who were formally detained in 
hospital under the 1983 Act. As outlined above, however, the CQC regulates both 
health and social care services and their approach to improving the services spans 
the different settings in which this care is provided. Those settings include 
hospitals in the NHS and the independent sector, specialist care services, 
community services, care homes and some aspects of the criminal justice system, 
for example prison ‘in-reach’ services. Patients may be deprived of their liberty in 
any of these settings, as they may be subject to a term of imprisonment, detained 
under the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS provisions) in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, subject to de facto detention or compulsorily detained under 
domestic mental health legislation. This key change in regulation has the potential 
to impact significantly on the standards of care and the effectiveness of the 
safeguards for patients in psychiatric and social care institutions. MHA 
Commissioners (as CQC part-time employees) continue to visit patients detained 
under the mental health legislation, and generic compliance inspectors are 
responsible for monitoring patients detained under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
or those who are subject to de facto detention in care homes/hospitals. In theory, 
the CQC is now well placed to assess whether health and social care organizations 
ensure that people are supported by an appropriate package of care that spans the 
different services they use. 
The intention is that the joint of arms of the CQC (compliance and mental 
health inspection) should be able to bolster each other to provide a more effective 
safeguard. And it is anticipated by some that the broader remit of the CQC (to 
include all types of mental health patient) could enable more effective scrutiny 
and follow up of standards, provided the work of both sectors is carefully 
structured and aligned.  As noted by Hale: 
 ‘the quality of patient and resident care should be improved by 
combining the specific duties to protect individual detained and 
compulsory patients with strong powers to enforce better standards across 
the whole field of health and social care’ (2010:223-4).  
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The extent to which the CQC is in fact able to provide more effective 
scrutiny and oversight of mental health care and detention will be explored below, 
with particular reference to the OPCAT requirements and the factors identified by 
Baldwin and Cave relating to achieving a legitimate system of regulation. 
Expertise and Independence 
MHA Commissioners have traditionally been drawn from a variety of 
professional backgrounds, as recommended by the Association for the Prevention 
of Torture (APT 2006:52), spanning law, psychiatry, psychology, health and social 
care. This is in line with the requirements of Article 18 of the OPCAT in relation 
to professional knowledge and expertise of NPM members. The MHAC consisted 
of approximately 100 Commissioners, comprising ‘a notable array of specialist 
expertise’ (McHale 2003:381) in mental health law and/or services.  McHale 
observed that Commissioners ‘provide[d] a largely volunteer workforce of 
hundreds of individuals across the country who have developed considerable 
expertise in making non-judicial judgments which are an aid to both patients and 
local managers’ (2003:381). This was certainly reassuring for patients and 
ensured that the views of Commissioners were more likely to be respected by 
those working in mental health and social care. One of the keys to achieving 
effective regulation and scrutiny is to gain the respect and trust of those working 
within the regulated sector (Baldwin and Cave 1999:80). It is also important for 
patients and service users to feel that they can trust individual Commissioners, to 
enable them to open up and talk about their experiences of mental health detention 
and care. It is equally important for Commissioners to have the right skills and 
experience to talk to patients who may be agitated and distressed. As noted by 
Lord Patel, the former Chairman of the MHAC in 2009, ‘Visiting staff will need to 
be comfortable meeting with mental health patients and service users who on 
occasions maybe highly disturbed. This is a specialist role and not one for people 
without adequate training, experience or commitment’ (MHAC 2008:256). 
Crucially, this expertise and experience has been preserved within the CQC, in 
line with the OPCAT requirements, as the majority of Commissioners have been 
retained and continue to carry out their role of inspecting and monitoring patients 
detained under the MHA.   
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The CQC is a generic monitoring body, which is the product of a merger 
of several predecessor commissions – the Commission for Social Care Inspection, 
the Healthcare Commission and the MHAC. Three quite different organizations 
have been replaced with one multi-functional organization that licenses and 
monitors providers across a wide spectrum of health and adult social care. 
Questions do arise as to whether it is more appropriate for visiting bodies to be 
specialists or have breadth of expertise. There are concerns that having a national 
monitoring body which has a broader, more generic remit, such as the CQC, could 
lead to a ‘dilution of specialist skills and a reduction in the already stretched 
resources’ (Hale 2010:223). This could already be a problem for some groups of 
detained patients, as the responsibility for monitoring the Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 currently falls within the remit of 
generic Compliance Inspectors, who are recruited from a range of diverse 
backgrounds and professions and may not possess appropriate knowledge or 
expertise. Based on the experience of the MHAC, it is considered vital for the 
CQC to ensure that all its front-line inspectors (both generic and mental health) 
continue to bring appropriate skills, experience and expertise to the role, in order 
to comply with the NPM criteria for capability and professional 
knowledge/expertise.  
Preserving the expertise of the Commissioners, and ensuring appropriate 
training and skills is also important from the point of view of trying to promote a 
legitimate system of regulation. As noted by Baldwin and Cave, such knowledge 
and expertise on the part of the regulator will make it easier for the regulator to 
make informed choices (1999:80). It also serves to enhance the regulator’s 
perceived legitimacy amongst the regulated group, in this case, the mental health 
care sector. Moreover, regulators and inspectors who have first-hand knowledge 
of the sector are likely to enjoy easier access to the information required to set 
appropriate rules and standards. As noted by other commentators, this is likely to 
be more cost-effective (Boyes and Gunn 2007:108). And significantly, this also 
helps to promote a greater degree of trust and co-operation between the regulator 
and the regulated sector.  However, commentators do caution that close 
relationships of this nature are more susceptible to regulatory ‘capture’ (Baldwin 
and Cave 1999:36), which occurs when the regulatory body is subject to undue 
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pressure from the sector and puts the sector’s interests ahead of the public at large. 
This can compromise the regulator’s independence and impartiality. The MHAC 
was particularly susceptible to this as it had no powers of compulsion and was 
dependent on the co-operation of the sector to provide information and the 
sector’s goodwill to implement its recommendations (Boyes and Gunn 2007:108). 
However this danger has now been minimized as the CQC does have specific 
powers to compel health care providers to supply information and remedy 
deficiencies. But the risk of capture has not been completely eliminated, as the 
CQC does still depend on the health and adult social care sector to provide it with 
a lot of information to help it to carry out its function (Baldwin and Cave 
1999:36).9  
Individual MHA Commissioners continue to be independent from the 
government, judiciary and the authorities responsible for places of detention. The 
MHAC (and also now the CQC) deployed its Commissioners in such a way as to 
ensure their independence from the services they visit (MHAC 2008: para. 8.9). 
For instance, Commissioners employed within the NHS would only be deployed 
to visit locations and settings outside their own employing Trust/care provider. 
This minimised the risk of any potential conflict of interest and ensured a degree 
of impartiality and independence.  However, one of the shortcomings of the 
MHAC was the fact that it was directly accountable to the Secretary of State for 
Health. The MHAC’s activities were ‘almost entirely conducted on behalf of the 
Minister’ and the Minister for Health determined its budget (ss. 120 and 121 
Mental Health Act 1983). As acknowledged by the MHAC in its final biennial 
report, this does not satisfy to the letter the requirements of OPCAT relating to the 
need for operational and financial independence of the NPM. It also led to 
criticism from Cavadino who, in 1995, was highly disparaging of the MHAC’s 
confused ‘inchoate and hybrid’ status (1995:58).  He maintained that it was 
created in an ‘unsystematic manner which left its role, structure and 
accountability ambiguous’. Whilst the MHAC was ‘allowed and encouraged to 
                                                        
9
   As noted by Baldwin and Cave ‘[t]his gives the regulated [sector] a degree of leverage 
over regulatory procedures and objectives, a leverage that, over time, produces capture’. 
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act as it if were independent…  ultimately it was on the end of a long rope that 
could always be hauled in if it was thought to be necessary’ (1995:58). 
In contrast, the CQC is constitutionally independent as a non-departmental 
monitoring body at arm's length from the government. In theory, this 
independence means that the CQC is better placed to provide a critical eye and 
objective view, in line with the OPCAT requirements. However, in one respect, 
the functional independence of the CQC is no better than the MHAC.10 Even 
though MHA Commissioners are no longer working 'on behalf of' the Secretary of 
State (s. 52 Health and Social Care Act 2008), section 48 of the Health and Social 
Care Act 2008 allows the Secretary of State to require the CQC to undertake 
special reviews or investigations. Several 'special reviews' have been mandated by 
the Secretary of State in the last few years: Learning Disability hospital services 
post-Winterbourne; nutrition in elderly services; private clinics after the concerns 
about breast implants and more recently the Secretary of State instigated a CQC 
review of abortion clinics.  Whilst none of these were explicitly MHA issues, 
this does mean that CQC resources are, to a degree, still under Ministerial 
control.  On the other hand, Mental Health Act monitoring work is budgeted 
separately within the CQC, and one would hope that the Secretary of State would 
be careful not to be seen to interfere in MHA work, unless it was being 
catastrophically mismanaged.  But nevertheless, this still remains a theoretical 
possibility and a potential problem for OPCAT compliance.  
 
There is however a key difference between the MHAC and CQC powers 
that could improve the latter’s regulatory footprint. The MHACs role as a 
regulator of mental health care standards was hampered by its lack of enforcement 
powers. It could not compel providers to make specific changes and relied heavily 
on persuasion and the co-operation of mental health care providers to implement 
its recommendations. As noted by other legal commentators, whilst the MHAC 
did have a useful ‘power to “name and shame” in its published biennial reports 
presented to Parliament… [the MHAC] was severely limited in its ability to 
provide justice for detained individuals ’ (Boyes and Gunn 2007:111). And some 
                                                        
10
   I am grateful to one of my mental health law colleagues for highlighting this point. 
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people were concerned that the MHAC was  ‘not sufficiently “heavyweight” to 
give appropriate redress and protection to an exceedingly vulnerable group’ 
(Boyes and Gunn 2007:111). In contrast to the MHAC, which had teeth but no 
bite, the CQC, as a national public inspectorate has (in theory) greater resources 
and the power to impose sanctions on failing institutions and NHS Trusts. Where 
the CQC is concerned that hospitals and NHS Trusts are failing to meet essential 
standards of quality and safety, it can impose conditions on registration. For 
example, West London Mental Health Trust was judged not to be meeting one of 
these standards, as it did not have a system in place to ensure patients’ detention 
papers were properly renewed under the 1983 Act.11 The CQC also has the power 
in England to take enforcement action to remove the registration of hospitals and 
care homes thereby closing down a particular location. The CQC does regularly 
inspect independent (i.e. privately run) facilities and shut down one of the 
hospitals operated by Castlebeck Care Ltd at Winterbourne View, Bristol in 2011. 
Following widespread allegations of abuse, neglect and ill treatment, the CQC 
inquiry found that Castlebeck Care Ltd had failed to ensure that people living at 
Winterbourne View were adequately protected from risk, including the risks of 
unsafe practices by its own staff. Consequently, the CQC took enforcement action 
to remove the registration of Winterbourne View and the hospital closed in June 
2011. Although, significantly, this case also highlights the failure of the system in 
some cases to adequately protect people with learning disabilities, challenging 
behaviour and mental health problems.  (CQC 2011:12). The shocking conditions 
at Winterbourne View were uncovered by an undercover BBC journalist, and not 
by the CQC’s own inspections. Protecting this most vulnerable group of patients 
is surely now a priority for the CQC. The CQC has recognised that it should have 
been quicker in taking action at Winterbourne View. In response it embarked upon 
a targeted programme of 150 unannounced inspections of hospitals and care 
homes that care for people with learning disabilities.12 More than 100 of these are 
                                                        
11
   ‘CQC lifts condition on West London Mental Health NHS Trust’ located at:  
http://www.cqc.org.uk//newsandevents/pressreleases. 
12
   See www.cqc.org.uk - Press Release on 4 April 2012. The programme was focused on 
two outcomes relating to the government’s essential standards of quality and safety at that time, 
looking at whether people experience safe and appropriate care, treatment and support and 
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NHS and independent providers that deliver assessment and treatment, 
rehabilitation and longer term care. The findings of the review suggest a lack of 
understanding about what safe, person-centred care looks like.13 All the services 
where concerns have been identified must now tell the CQC how and when they 
will improve. Those failing to meet essential standards could face enforcement 
action and will face re-inspection if improvements are not made.  
 
Service User Engagement 
 
Visiting members of the former MHAC included users of services, 
including those who had been detained under the 1983 Act. This is particularly 
important as former service users can bring the benefits of their own personal 
experiences at other institutions to their visiting role, as well as building up trust 
and strong relationships with patients. Under the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with a Disability (CRPD)14, for example, State parties are required to 
‘closely consult with’ and ‘actively involve’ persons with disabilities in decision-
making processes related to them.15 This, it is argued, can greatly add to the 
effectiveness of monitoring work as such individuals are ‘experts by experience’ 
and have a particular role to play during visits, as they may be able to pick up on 
ill-treatment which may remain invisible to other monitors who have not been 
‘through the system’ (MDAC 2010:14). Equally, their presence on the monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                        
whether they are protected from abuse. A final report summarizing the main findings across 
providers was published in 2012 and is available on the CQC website. The overall conclusion is 
that leadership and governance needs to be stronger to ensure that services are safe and meet 
essential standards. 
13
   Ibid. See also www.cqc.org.uk/public/reports-surveys-and-reviews/themed-
inspections/review-learning-disability-services. 
14
   The CRPD was adopted on 13th December 2006 and came into force on 3rd May 2008. 
Some commentators argue that the Convention alters social perceptions by taking a principled 
approach to disability equality. See further B McSherry and P Weller (Eds.), Rethinking Rights-
based Mental Health Laws (Hart Publishing 2010) 
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team may help to establish trust between the monitor and the patient/resident and 
could result in reports on visits that are more reflective of the needs of those 
deprived of their liberty in such institutions (MDAC 2010:15). 
 
The MHAC valued the involvement of service users to the extent that it set 
up a Service User Reference Panel (SURP) in 2005. The Panel formed part of a 
wider service user involvement strategy to provide the MHAC with a service user 
perspective on all aspects of its work, including working alongside 
Commissioners on visiting activity. The panel was made up of 20-30 people who 
were, or had been, detained patients, and it brought a unique and powerful 
perspective to the monitoring and inspection work of the MHAC.  Involving 
patients and service users is a vital step towards understanding the impact of 
deprivation of liberty and the quality of care in individual settings. A report by the 
MHAC into the first two years of the Service User Involvement Strategy, 
including the SURP, found that user involvement had become a regular part of 
most aspects of MHAC activity. In particular it was making a positive impact in 
terms of influencing future work programmes, contributing to projects, and direct 
involvement in the day-to-day practice of visiting Commissioners through joint 
visits (MHAC 2007). Involving service users directly in visiting activity was 
shown to assist communication with detained patients and members of the panel 
were able to provide an independent and user-focused view (MHAC 2008:23). 
The MHAC made real progress on user involvement and felt strongly that ‘it is 
only by engaging users as the true voice of experience that the effect of detention 
can be assessed’ (MHAC 2008:264).  
 
The CQC continues to involve service users in the monitoring role in this 
way.  (CQC 2011:12). It tries to focus on the mental health patient’s experience by 
constantly drawing on the feedback and suggestions of the SURP. One of the 
recent CQC annual reports into the MHA has highlighted the value of the SURP 
in ensuring that detained patients have a voice. The panel brings a ‘unique and 
expert perspective’ and it is certainly reassuring to know that service user 
                                                                                                                                                        
   Article 4 (3)); OHCHR, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. Guidance for human rights monitors. Professional training series No. 17 (New York 
and Geneva 2010) p. 33 
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involvement still forms a routine part of the CQC’s MHA monitoring role (CQC 
2011b:12). The CQC indicates that service users do still accompany MHA 
Commissioners on inspection visits.16 The CQC has also established a Mental 
Health Improvement Board to advise the CQC on improving outcomes for people 
who use mental health services and on how the CQC monitors the Mental Health 
Act. A range of other initiatives has also been introduced to involve service users 
and the public more broadly in their inspection work. For example, the Experts by 
Experience programme seeks to involve former service users from a diverse range 
of backgrounds directly in compliance visits.  They take part in the inspection 
visits and help inspectors write their reports. As acknowledged by the CQC: 
 
‘Not only do they bring their own distinctive perspective to the inspection, 
but their presence also helps people using the service to feel more relaxed 
and confident about talking about their care’ (CQC 2012: Section 3). 
 
Moreover, the CQC is required to publish, after consultation, a Statement 
on User Involvement. As noted by Prosser, ‘this goes much further than the 
statutory participation requirements of any other regulator’ (2010:133-4) and 
provides a valuable opportunity for inclusive and reflective regulation. The extent 
to which regulatory bodies operate transparent and accessible procedures is 
another key benchmarking factor in assessing whether a particular regulatory 
system is effective and acceptable (Baldwin and Cave 1999:79). The CQC’s 
commitment to service user involvement is a strong indication of the extent to 
which its processes are open and accessible, which can have a strong legitimating 
effect. Provided, of course, that the degree of user participation is meaningful and 
not purely tokenistic, and does not compromise the overall effectiveness of the 
CQC’s decision-making. 
 
 
Human Rights Focus  
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   Located at www.cqc.org.uk/public/what-are-standards/your-rights-under-mental-health-
act/what-can-mental-health-act-commissioner-do-for-you. 
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The involvement of service users charted above is an indication of how the 
MHAC put equality and human rights at the forefront of its work. It adopted a 
strong rights-based approach to regulation, by focusing specifically on the legal 
safeguards for detained patients and engaging directly with patient rights. The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights commented in 2007 that 
‘lessons can be learned from the more systematic approach [to human rights] 
pioneered by the Mental Health Act Commission‘ (HC 378: para. 188). Even 
greater attention must be paid to the conditions in psychiatric and care homes 
from a human rights perspective in the light of the recent European Court of 
Human Rights decision in Stanev v. Bulgaria.17 For the first time, the Court found 
a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR (prohibition against inhuman and degrading 
treatment) due to the appalling conditions that Mr Stanev had experienced over a 
period of seven years in a Bulgarian care home. The Court found that the food 
was insufficient and of poor quality; the building was inadequately heated in 
winter; the toilets were in an execrable state and Mr Stanev was only able to 
shower once a week in a dilapidated bathroom.  Even though there was no 
suggestion that the Bulgarian authorities deliberately intended to treat Mr Stanev 
in a degrading way, taken as a whole, his living conditions for this period of time 
amounted to degrading treatment, which clearly violated Article 3 of the ECHR. 
This is obviously an extreme case, but in light of some of the findings of severe 
and sustained abuse which occurred at Winterbourne View for example, the CQC 
should be mindful of the potential Article 3 violations where there is a prolonged 
period of abuse/ill treatment and persistent poor standards. 
The CQC appears keen to adopt a comparable rights-based approach to 
regulation, which is particularly relevant to those people detained under the MHA. 
The CQC has been working closely with the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission to develop joint guidance for inspectors and assessors, to ensure they 
scrutinize equality and human rights issues when reviewing providers’ standards 
of care. It is heavily focused on the ECHR, though does make some brief 
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   Application No. 36760/06, Judgment delivered by the Grand Chamber on 17th January 
2012. 
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reference to the United Nations CRPD and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, both of which have been ratified by the UK government.  The CQC has 
designed observational and interview tools to assist inspectors in assessing 
equality and human rights. It is encouraging to note that human rights and 
equality issues are intended to underpin the routine day-to-day work of inspectors 
and assessors.  
This rights-based regulation appears to permeate the rhetoric of the CQC. 
The MHAC reports focused closely on human rights issues and a recentthe 
CQCC’s most recent generic annual report also recognizes that it is important to 
embed equality and human rights into their regulatory work (CQC 2012:28). In 
March 2010, the CQC launched an Equality and Human Rights Scheme, which 
seeks to put equality and human rights at the forefront of all its work and 
activities. It refers to the need to adhere to the principles in the Human Rights Act 
1998 and states that the CQC is aiming to be a ‘rights-based organization …that 
observes and promotes the core human rights principles of fairness, respect, 
equality, dignity and autonomy for all’ (CQC 2010a:11). A key element of the 
scheme is to ensure that care is centered on people’s needs and protects their 
rights. The scheme is also intended to inform and influence the day-to-day work 
of inspectors and Commissioners, by encouraging them to look at equality and 
human rights issues in their standards compliance and inspection work. Quality 
and safety are at the heart of the CQC’s essential care standards, and, as noted 
above, several of the outcomes set by the care standards relate to basic human 
rights, such as the need to treat people with dignity and respect in Outcome 1.  
The CQC’s Third Report to Parliament on the State of Health Care and 
Adult Social Care in England 2010/11 (HC 1487) indicated that across both health 
and social care, some action has been taken by providers on race equality, 
followed by disability equality, religion and belief.  However, there are some 
equality issues that still receive less attention including age, gender, gender 
reassignment and sexual orientation. Under the NHS Constitution patients have 
the right to be treated with ‘dignity and respect, in accordance with [their] human 
rights.’ The report suggests that there are still continuing concerns about staff 
shortages and practices (for example call bells being put out of reach or curtains 
not being closed properly), which demonstrated a lack of respect for patient 
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dignity and privacy. (HC 1487:54-55). Moreover, there is very little evidence to 
suggest that the CQC engages directly with international human rights standards 
on the ground, nor does it specifically address whether there are breaches of UN 
Treaties such as OPCAT or the CRPD. Indeed, so far there has been very little 
guidance to national monitoring bodies such as the CQC on precisely how some 
of these international standards translate into practice at a national level (Steinerte, 
Murray and Laing, 2012). The CQC’s first report in 2010 into the operation of the 
MHA 1983 identified a number of failings, which could breach human rights 
principles and recommended a number of priority areas for improvement 
(2010b:23-24). It is therefore disappointing that the CQC’s more recent generic 
annual reports contain very little specific reference to human rights in health and 
social care (HC 1487:39).  There are also concerns about the adequacy of the 
training provided to generic compliance inspectors and their lack of awareness of 
these issues. 18 This is worrying in light of the breadth of services that they are 
expected to cover. At this stage, therefore, the available evidence would suggest 
that human rights and equality issues are not necessarily informing the work of 
the CQC inspectors as significantly as we would hope.. Moreover, the CQC’s 
Third Annual report acknowledges that there may be some under-reporting of 
human rights issues, such as dignity initiatives, in NHS Trusts as the work lacks 
central co-ordination and tends to be dispersed and localized (HC 1487:39). So 
there is still more work to be done to promote and embed patient dignity and 
awareness of international human rights within the regulatory work of the CQC.  
Inspection and visiting arrangements 
 
MHA Commissioners developed a close relationship between frequent 
personal meetings with patients and maintaining a high level-monitoring role. The 
Commission adopted a proactive visiting regime involving routine announced and 
unannounced visits. For example, in 1999-2001, Commissioners met over 22,000 
detained patients (Clayton 2002:101). The MHAC felt strongly that ‘regular and 
frequent visits to providers is the only way to ensure patients’ rights are protected, 
the potential for abuse of patients is minimized, and appropriate care is provided 
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   Private communication with CQC employee, April 2012. 
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at all times’ (MHAC 2008:264-264). Moreover, in order to be effective, visits 
must be frequent and regular with the opportunity for unannounced and short 
notice announcement visits.  Patients valued the opportunity to meet with 
individual Commissioners and speak to them about their experiences of detention 
and mental health care. Regular unannounced visits are a crucial tool in ensuring 
that patients’ rights are protected and that the potential for abuse is minimized. 
From a human rights perspective, this approach is clearly in line with several 
aspects of United Nations requirements for an effective National Preventive 
Mechanism (NPM) in Part IV of the OPCAT.19  The value of surprise 
unannounced visits in helping to drive up standards of care was recognised by the 
CQC in its Third Report into the State of Health and Adult Social care in England 
(HC 1487). The CQC plans to introduce more unannounced elements to 
monitoring the care sector in an attempt to improve the regulation of all health 
and social care standards. 
 The CQC set out its priorities at the start  for improving the quality and 
safety of mental health services. These include ensuring that people using mental 
health services receive care that is safe and promotes their health and wellbeing, 
as well as receiving care in an environment that promotes respect, choice, 
involvement and autonomy; informing and involving service users; and promoting 
equality and diversity (CQC 2009:9-10). In order to continue to provide effective 
inspection and monitoring and promote the welfare and health of patients, it is 
vital for the CQC to preserve qualitative input at the same time as quantitative 
monitoring. The function of meeting patients is seen as essential to provide 
practical evidence as to whether the legislation is being implemented properly in 
relation to individual patients and observing more generally the standards and 
quality of patient care. It is crucial to preserve the practice of proactively visiting 
hospitals, making unannounced visits and meeting directly with patients. The 
government’s obligations to people who are deprived of their liberty would not be 
met by reactive visits alone. And as one commentator has noted 
                                                        
19
   Several concepts appear in this Article which are fundamental to the National 
Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – preventive visits; undertaken on a regular basis that form part of 
an overall system of visits; experts of the NPM should have the required capabilities and 
professional knowledge and the NPM should have functional independence from the State. See 
further Articles 18 and 19 of OPCAT. 
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‘Such meetings are also vital to the well-being of individual patients, who 
often have no other independent person to whom they can turn for 
informed advice and help’ (Clayton 2002:103).  
The CQC states that it aims to visit every psychiatric ward where patients 
are detained at no more than eighteen-month intervals and many wards are visited 
more frequently than this, according to perceived need. The CQC anticipates 
having approx. 6,000 contacts with patients each year, the majority of which will 
be unannounced visits (CQC 2010a:25). During 2011/12, the Commissioners 
carried out 1,546 visits and met with 4,569 patients in private (CQC 2011b).20 It is 
a concern that the total number of annual patient visits by Commissioners does 
seem to be declining since the CQC took over. This could be explained by internal 
tensions, resource constraints or changes to the working patterns of MHA 
Commissioners in an attempt to harmonise the compliance and inspection visits. It 
could also be due to the increased workloads and sheer number of providers that 
the CQC is now expected to regulate. Whatever the cause, it does signal a decline 
in direct contact with patients and less focus on qualitative data collection, which 
is worrying as it raises questions about how well the CQC is discharging its 
monitoring duty under s.120 MHA for detained patients. and .  
 
Accountability, Reporting and Public Scrutiny 
The MHAC was required to produce biennial reports that were laid before 
Parliament. In contrast, the CQC produces an annual report, which is also laid 
before Parliament, on the exercise of its functions under the MHA (s. 120D MHA 
1983). In this way, the work of the CQC (and previously the MHAC) is subject to 
public examination and parliamentary scrutiny. This is another important 
benchmarking element that is often used to establish the legitimacy of regulatory 
bodies. As noted by Baldwin and Cave, regulatory agencies which are accountable 
in this way to an elected representative body, such as Parliament, claim that ‘this 
oversight renders its exercise of powers acceptable’ (1999:79). 
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   Similarly, in 2009/10, the Commissioners met with 5,078 patients, made 1,711 visits to 
wards, and around 1 in 3 of those visits were unannounced and 9% took place at the weekend – 
See CQC, Monitoring the Mental Health Act in 2009/10 (CQC 2010) p. 16. 
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The MHAC reports were voluminous and authoritative narratives on the 
operation of the MHA. The reports evolved over time to promote good practice 
and provide important accounts of the experiences of detained patients and 
standards of mental health care. As well as commenting specifically on the 
operation of the mental health legislation with respect to detained patients, the 
reports would highlight more generally areas of concern about staff shortages, 
ward conditions and standards of care in psychiatric settings. The biennial reports 
helped to influence numerous specific improvements in mental health services 
and compliance with the MHA. In the words of William Bingley:  
‘As the years went by, the scope of the reports expanded to include 
extensive summaries of relevant legal developments, discussion of 
potential relevant legal and policy development as well as the concerns 
identified by the everyday visiting activities of Commissioners’ (2011:121) 
Repeatedly, the biennial reports found huge variations in the quality of 
care across inpatient mental health services and disproportionate levels of 
coercive treatment, particularly experienced by some black and ethnic minority 
groups. For example, the Twelfth Biennial Report highlighted continuing 
concerns over ward environments as well as patient dignity and safety (MHAC 
2008: para. 2.1). The report containedThere have also been frequent examples of 
the use of seclusion and restraint being carried out without adherence to the 
Mental Health Act Code of Practice or the use of appropriate safeguards (MHAC 
2008: paras. 2.125-2.135). Consequently, the MHAC reports regularly 
recommended improvements to staff training, ward conditions and overall 
changes to the delivery and quality of patient care. One of the main shortcomings 
of the MHAC however, was that it was not empowered to enforce its 
recommendations. And the fact that the same concerns were repeatedly 
highlighted in successive reports suggests that it was not able to exert sufficient 
influence to bring about wholesale improvements in mental health care. In one 
sense, the reports were useful as they had the power to ‘name and shame’ 
offending providers and services, but there was no guarantee that the 
recommendations would be acted on or implemented.21 As discussed above, the 
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CQC does have more extensive powers to impose sanctions and impose 
conditions on registration in an attempt to effect improvements.  And there are 
many examples on the CQC’s website where it has exercised these powers to take 
enforcement action. 
So far, the CQC has published three specific mental health monitoring 
annual reports, which are considerably shorter and far less detailed than those of 
the MHAC. They certainly do not provide us with a rich source of data and 
detailed analysis, as the MHAC reports have done previously. Perhaps that is 
inevitable given the need to produce reports on a more frequent annual basis. 
However it is lamentable that we have lost the depth and breadth of data and 
analysis that was present in the Biennial reports, as they were a tremendously 
useful resource. Rather than provide a detailed overview of the operation of the 
MHA, the CQC reports published to date have focused on a number of key issues, 
which have emerged from the recent MHA Commissioner observations and visits. 
Foremost are concerns about inadequate staffing levels, cultures of control and 
containment, and over-occupancy of beds. These were repeatedly identified by the 
MHAC in its biennial reports. Two of the One of the essential standards for 
registration (Outcome 13) refers to the need to ensure that patients are safe and 
cared for by enough properly qualified staffbecause there are sufficient numbers 
of the right staff. So the onus is on hospital managers/care providers to 
demonstrate that the staffing levels are sufficient to protect patients, otherwise the 
CQC could take enforcement action. Some MHA Commissioners have been 
concerned about the lack of patient involvement in planning, developing and 
reviewing their own treatment and care. This is a key strand of outcome 1 one of 
of the essential standards. Significantly, the CQC has also published its first 
reports on how the DoLS are being implemented in care homes, hospitals, 
councils and primary care trusts (CQC 2011c; 2012b). The most notable findings 
suggest lack of training and awareness among some managers and staff of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
   As noted by Lady Hale, ‘the MHAC was not always able to produce results’, and she 
cites two such examples, where improvements did not occur at Broadmoor Hospital until others 
stepped in and how the MHAC failed to uncover the severity of problems subsequently revealed 
by the Blom-Cooper inquiry at Ashworth Special Hospital (2010: 226). 
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DoLS provisions. The CQC has pledged to continue to monitor these issues 
closely. 
 
As well as producing annual reports summarizing its regulatory work, the 
CQC is well placed to carry out specialist surveys and reports into particular areas 
of care, such as mental health and maternity services. For example, it conducts an 
annual community mental health survey that will provide valuable information to 
assess progress in improving people’s experiences of care and support.22 This 
information can be used to further inform the work of MHA Commissioners and 
compliance inspectors, as it is important to make the best use of the available 
sources of data and intelligence. 
The CQC has been held to account and its work subject to considerable 
external scrutiny and review, both in the media, in the mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust inquiry,23 and by the National Audit Office (HC 1665) and 
Parliamentary Health Select Committee in 2011 (HC 1430) and again in 2012 
(HC 592). The National Audit Office commented that ‘against a background of 
considerable upheaval, the CQC has had an uphill struggle to carry out its work 
effectively and has experienced serious difficulties’ (HC 1665:10). And the 
Parliamentary Health Select Committee was highly critical of the CQC’s overly 
tight timescales and resources, bureaucratic registration process and distorted 
priorities (HC 1430). Its first report, published in September 2011,  highlighted 
the decline in inspections during the first 6 months of the new regulatory regime 
and the regulator’s ‘distortion of priorities’ by focusing on ‘the essentially 
administrative task of registration’ at the expense of ‘its core function of 
inspection’ (HC 1430: para. 6). Taken together, the findings indicate that this 
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   The 2011 survey of people who use community mental health services was completed 
by over 17,000 people aged 16 and over. The vast majority of participants said they were listened 
to and had trust in their health and social care workers. However, the findings show there is room 
for improvement, especially in involving service users more directly in some aspects of their care. 
See www.cqc.org.uk 
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   The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry Final Report (February 
2013) located at www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com. 
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‘super’ regulator is struggling to manage its workload and meet its new (and 
expanding) responsibilities. 
Integrating mental health monitoring within the CQC 
Another crucial element to the success of the CQC’s role in monitoring all 
aspects of mental health detention and care is how the MHA monitoring role links 
in to the CQC’s wider regulatory role. Successful integration and cooperation 
between the compliance and MHA Commissioner inspection teams is a vital 
component..  One suspects that there have been some teething problems in terms 
of alignment and joint working during the initial stages, which forced the CQC to 
review its mental health monitoring programme in 2010 and again in 2013 (CQC 
2013d:10). The CQC’s MHA monitoring report for 2010-2011 (CQC 2011b:13) 
suggested that, following the initial review, MHA commissioners and compliance 
inspectors are working more closely together. The CQC published a joint working 
protocol for MHA Commissioners and compliance inspectors, to promote joint 
and coordinated visiting, pooled expertise and report sharing (CQC July 2011d). It 
is encouraging to hear that there are some examples of inspectors taking MHA 
Commissioners’ visit reports into account when assessing a provider’s 
compliance, and some inspectors and MHA Commissioners will combine forces 
by visiting a service together.  The monitoring report highlights the importance of 
a coordinated response between MHA Commissioners and compliance inspection 
staff (2011b:12-14). It recognizes that the evidence collected by MHA 
Commissioners can help to give a picture of the operation of the Mental Health 
Act across a provider and to identify where wider problems lie. This information 
can then be used to evaluate whether essential standards are being met and for the 
CQC to take enforcement action where necessary. The CQC’s Annual Report for 
2010/11 includes an example of a MHA Commissioner working closely with the 
Compliance Inspector by carrying out a joint inspection and producing a joint 
report, which identified a number of concerns about a hospital in London 
providing mental health services.  There are also specific examples provided 
where MHA Commissioner findings have triggered a review of compliance with 
the essential standards (CQC 2011b:35 and 55). And in this way, the CQC should 
be able to use the wider regulatory framework to strengthen the protection given 
to people subject to the MHA (CQC 2013d: 10).  It should also be able to avoid 
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unnecessary duplication and guard against discrepancies in reports to providers, 
provided, of course, that the spirit of cooperation is evinced on the front line 
inspections. This could be a major obstacle, as it is unclear the extent to which 
this team-working spirit and protocol is being consistently followed on the 
ground. As has been found elsewhere in public sector joint working, often the 
reality does not meet the rhetoric, particularly when those involved have 
inadequate cross-professional understanding, different agendas as well as distinct 
organisational cultural differences and distrust (Glover-Thomas 2007:224). 
Conclusion  
A number of key features outlined above have highlighted how the MHAC 
adopted a proactive, rights-based and patient-centred approach to its monitoring 
role. The presence of an effective national monitoring body in line with OPCAT is 
essential, and early indications suggest that the CQC is attempting to maintain and 
(in some respects) enhance the approach carried out by its predecessor, the 
MHAC. The retention of experienced MHA Commissioners, the maintenance of a 
preventive visiting regime (though, worryingly, perhaps less direct contact with 
detained patients) coupled with the continued involvement of service users in the 
monitoring role and its rhetorical commitment to embedding human rights, are all 
noteworthy examples. A recent CQC annual report has included Mental Health 
Act monitoring as one of eight delivery priorities for 2011/12 and beyond (CQC 
2012:37). Moreover, the CQC is attempting to promote a legitimate system of 
rights-based regulation in many respects: by focusing on service user 
participation, human rights and due process; by preserving appropriate expertise; 
and by promoting accountability and external scrutiny through the submission of 
annual reports to Parliament and the publication of priorities and objectives.   
But the CQC is still in its infancy in comparison to the MHAC, and we 
have yet to see whether it will be able to preserve the depth and breadth of 
monitoring commitment evinced by its predecessor. It does take time for 
organizations such as the CQC to effect change and earn the trust of the regulated 
bodies and wider public: 
It is self evident that an evolutionary process in which knowledge 
and expertise accumulates and develops over time... is necessary for 
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confidence in any system to take root….A regulatory body only succeeds to 
the degree that it has the confidence of the wider population that it serves, 
including those who are patients and those who work in health care 
institutions (Oyebode et al 2004:240). 
The abuses uncovered at Winterbourne View, and the findings of 
mismanagement and distorted priorities at the CQC suggest that there have been 
extremely turbulent times for the organisation. It still has a long way to go in 
gaining the respect and confidence of patients, staff and the general public. Its 
success in doing so will be determined by the amount of resources which are 
made available to it by the government, how well it manages the public’s 
expectations, as well as how effectively the organization is able to align the 
different aspects of its work and manage the future expansion in its scope. 
Significantly that now includes the registration of primary medical services in 
2012 and 2013, although fortunately, the CQC’s remit will not now be extended to 
include the functions of the Human Tissue and Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Authorities, following the outcome of a public consultation in 2012.24 
Even so, the CQC now regulates more than 21,000 care providers operating 
services from more than 36,000 locations. The inclusion of primary medical 
services last year has recently added a further 8,000 providers and locations. In 
addition, the legal requirements of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 mean that 
providers must be registered and accountable for each separate regulated activity 
they provide. The CQC itself has acknowledged that it has struggled at times with 
the sheer amount of processing and recording of data involved, which led to a 
backlog of applications (CQC 2012:7 and 11).  
It is now crucial for the CQC to manage the public’s expectations in a 
more realistic way and raise awareness of its limitations. The CQC can promote 
and encourage good quality care, but it cannot completely eliminate abuse and 
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   The government had initially considered expanding the scope of the CQC to embrace 
these functions as well as the work of the MHAC, but the government decided not to proceed with 
this aspect of the proposal following a public consultation in 2012. The three regulators have 
instead developed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote joint working, share information 
and avoid duplication. See CQC Press Release, Working with the Human Tissue Authority and 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority 8 January 2012 located at www.cqc.org.uk. 
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deliberate mistreatment, especially where that abuse is concealed. There is also a 
responsibility on care providers and staff to deliver good quality care and meet the 
essential standards. The National Audit Office specifically commented on the 
public’s high expectations of the regulator in its report into the CQC. One of the 
key findings in the report by the Comptroller General was the gap between what 
the public and providers expect of the CQC and what it can achieve as a regulator 
(HC 1665:7). This is partly due to the fact that the Commission’s role has changed 
over time, and that has not always been communicated effectively.  
The CQC is seeking to address some of the criticisms by developing a new 
strategy in consultation with the public, and by setting out more clearly what the 
public can expect from it. The new strategy was launched in April 201325 and the 
overall focus has been placed on increased service user involvement and 
promoting patient rights. The regulator is taking positive steps to publish better 
information for the public, introduce national teams with specialist expertise and 
develop new standards of care.  Specifically, with respect to mental health 
monitoring, there is a commitment to strengthening patient rights in line with the 
OPCAT requirements and to align more closely the mental health and mental 
capacity (DoLS) oversight (CQC 2013c:21). The CQC has also pledged to 
continue to involve people with direct experience of mental health care more 
extensively in its inspection and monitoring work, through the Experts by 
Experience programme (CQC 2013c:22; CQC 2013d:11). There is also a 
commitment to improve the training and guidance to front line staff on mental 
capacity in particular (CQC 2013c:21) )as well as improving the integration of 
regulation and Mental Health Act monitoring (CQC 2013d:10). This new 
approach will be developed over the next 12 months in consultation with key 
stakeholders in the mental health sector (CQC 2013d:3) e strategyThese changes 
are is promising and suggests that the CQC is committed in principle to improving 
improving the mental health inspectionmonitoring system and OPCAT 
compliance. As highlighted in this article, these are key areas where further 
development is required for the CQC to strengthen its protection for detained 
                                                        
25
   See further www.cqc.org.uk
 
29 
 
patients. However, the CQC’s budget is less than the combined budget of its 
predecessor bodies, although it has significantly more responsibilities (HC 
1665:7). It can only achieve its aims if it is well-resourced, well-managed and has 
a clear sense of purpose and strategic direction. The appointment of a new Chief 
Executive from September 2012 should may go some way towards achieving this. 
But this new ‘super’ Commission has not yet managed to gain the full respect and 
confidence of the public, or the health and social care practitioners who work in 
the regulated sector. As identified at the beginning of this article, this latter factor 
is essential in terms of the influence and ‘impact’ that the CQC will be able to 
make to drive improvements in adult health and social care. In contrast, the 
MHAC was generally well regarded and respected within the mental health field, 
though it wasn’t able to exert sufficient political pressure or ‘bite’ on wards/units 
that were failing.   
The CQC is facing an uphill struggle and its capacity to rebuild trust is 
likely to be hindered by its diverse and expanding responsibilities. There is a 
considerable danger that mental health monitoring could become subsumed within 
the wider regulatory focus of general healthcare inspection and registration' 
particularly given the ever-increasing scope of that regulation. Thus far, mental 
health monitoring does seem to be forming a distinct and important focus of the 
CQC’s work and the new strategy suggests that will continue for the next few 
years (CQC 2013d). There is plenty of opportunity for the CQC to embrace a 
proactive rights-based regulatory approach to monitoring mental health care, as it 
acknowledged when it published its Equality and Human Rights Scheme in 2010:  
‘…we have a unique opportunity to consider how equality and 
human rights can be embedded in everything we do – our aim is to weave 
equality and human rights into the day-to-day fabric of our work… We 
have a real opportunity, through the new registration system, to do things 
differently, to focus on outcomes for people and to take their experiences 
into account. We must put people who use services, their families and 
carers at the centre of everything we do…’  (CQC 2010a:2) 
Let us hope that, with the CQC’s reinforced rights-based strategy, 
commitment to strengthen mental health inspections and increased focus on 
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service user involvement, the reality will meet that rhetoric to protect the rights 
and standards of care for psychiatric patients. 
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